Creating Space for the Formation of the Grand Alliance:
Possible
Initiatives to Distract China
from the Formation of the Grand Alliance
Matthew
Anderson - matta@uga.edu
September,
2007
The "Grand Alliance" of democracies described in Carlo Pelanda's book
may be the best hope for preserving the relative peace and prosperity of the
last sixty years while the structure of global governance changes.?However, the first step of creating an EU-US
alliance is vulnerable to attempts by those who may be threatened by the
formation of such an alliance to sabotage its birth.?China, which stands to lose the
most from the Grand Alliance, is unlikely to stay idle while this counterweight
to its emerging power is formed. China's
most probable response would be to intensify its current tactic of using its
massive economic clout to divide and conquer individual European countries so
as to prevent them from cooperating with the US.?
Although the recent past has shown examples of European leaders being
both willing and able to resist Chinese attempts to influence their foreign
policy through economic blackmail, it would be naive and irresponsible to
simply assume that this will always be the case.?Therefore, the US
should initiate a concerted, offensive strategy that distracts and diverts
Chinese focus and resources in order to alleviate the pressure China can exert
on prospective Grand Alliance members.
?These
proposals are being presented under the assumption that US policymakers have already labeled China as a threat and view the Grand Alliance as
a feasible approach to confront the challenge of China.?These plans should in no way be viewed as an
alternative to the Grand Alliance. While they could be conducted outside
of the framework of the Grand Alliance, they are intended be used in conjunction
with the Grand Alliance.?The plan is to
consume Beijing's foreign policy experts' attention with the necessity to
defend against perceived threats to its influence in regions that it deems
strategically important, thus distracting them from the formation of the Grand
Alliance and allowing EU-US convergence to proceed unhindered.?While China
pays close attention to the moves of the Western powers and fears the formation
of an anti-Sino bloc, the Chinese leadership's goals are to:?First, preserve power over a unified China; second, assure the dominance of China in the
Asia-Pacific theater.?Only after
achieving these goals will China
concern itself with other global developments.?
China has been able to act on a global scale and counter the formation
of a Grand Alliance until now because Beijing's first two goals have been
seemingly unchallenged, thus giving it the luxury to play a larger role on the
world stage.?However, given the current
regime’s strategic goals it is likely that if its priorities in China and the
surrounding Asia-Pacific region were threatened, then it would delay or abandon
its larger global strategy while it restored its dominance in its immediate
neighborhood.?China's preoccupation with the
events within its own borders and those of its neighboring countries would give
the Western democracies a chance to pursue the Grand Alliance without, or at
least diminished, Chinese interference.
Phase one: China
The first and most sensitive area to consider for this plan is China
itself. The Communist regime has since the founding of the PRC acted
with intense paranoia as it has ruthlessly fought to maintain political control
over a multi-ethnic Chinese empire.?Its
paranoia is reasonable considering its lack of legitimacy and the many forces
that want to tear the country apart. Its two largest fears are a
democratic uprising and ethnic-minority dissent
The first fear
of the regime is a direct challenge to the Chinese Communist Party's rule by
democratic forces.?In the past three
decades the CCP has been seriously challenged twice with the 1979 Democracy
Wall movement and the massacre at Tiananmen Square
in 1989. Further, the CCP has witnessed the fall of communism in most
other parts of the globe, as well as the emergence of an ethnically Chinese
democracy across the Taiwan Straits.?All
of these events have put pressure on the Chinese Communist Party because they
fear that they will be the next communist regime to succumb to the wave of
democratization that occurred with the fall of the Soviet
Union. Although the trend of democratization has since stalled and
even reversed in some regions, the CCP still fears that it is under attack from
democratic forces.?The US needs to
exacerbate the regime's fear of a democratic revolution. Direct US
government initiatives to this end would neither be effective nor beneficial.
The government in Beijing would perceive
this as flagrant meddling in its internal affairs, and possibly respond by
using its economic power to manipulate US business interests to exert pressure
on Washington
to stop such policies.?However, NGO's
and other second- track initiatives could be very useful. By focusing on
particular issues like the environment or rule of law, the US should
encourage American and other international NGO's to help expand or create
mirror Chinese NGO's.?Funding along with
help in organizing and running large campaigns could help the fledgling Chinese
NGO’s flourish as they take advantage of common Chinese citizens?growing
concern with the environment and rule of law issues.?The increase in the number of NGO’s and
amount of public protests inside China relating to these issues
demonstrate their potential for being used to challenge the regime.?Any increase in the number and efficacy of
NGO’s would be especially troubling to the regime since it is very suspicious
of any groups not directly controlled by the CCP.
The next force
that is threatening China's
internal cohesion is the grievances of its ethnic minorities.?China's population is over 90% Han,
but the rest of the population is a mixture of fifty-five different ethnic
groups. These minority ethnicities may only constitute a small fraction
of China's
overall population, but in many provinces they are the majority. These
ethnic minority-majority provinces are the poorer and less developed regions of
the interior that are increasingly opposed to being ruled by Beijing
because they are not benefiting from China's economic development.
China's current leader, Hu Jintao, has tried to address this problem with
his "Harmonious Society" platform, but in terms of investment and
economic growth, the interior provinces where most of the ethnic minorities
live lag far behind the Han Chinese-dominated Eastern coast.
The most visible
of these problems is the province of Xinjiang in western China.?It has a majority Uighur population that is
Muslim and ethnically closer to the population of Kazakhstan.?Discontent with the Han Chinese who control
Xinjiang’s economy and Beijing’s oppressive
religious policies have created much animosity towards Beijing’s control of the region and there is
a small separatist movement currently operating. There have even been terrorist
attacks attributed to the Uighurs in China in the past.?While an independent Xinjiang, or Eastern
Turkestan as the Uighurs call it, is not possible in the near future, Washington could find a way to at least alarm the
authorities in Beijing
enough to warrant the initiation of a massive campaign to restore order.?Given the regime’s enduring paranoia, it
would not take much to alarm it.?Strengthening
the economic and political position of Kazakhstan, which will be proposed in a
following section, could serve to increase the ethnic pride of the Uighurs and
show how life might improve with separation from China as their more affluent
relatives in Kazakhstan would serve as an example of what the Uighurs could
aspire to with their own sovereign state not run by the Han Chinese.?In addition, the US should expand its Voice of
America to broadcast in Uighur as many Uighurs cannot speak Mandarin.?
Phase two: China's Asian Neighbors
Outside of China, the next area where the US should look to attack Chinese interests is China's
neighbors. China's
plan for the future is to build a Chinese sphere of influence in Asia so that the Chinese bloc will be the largest and
most powerful bloc in the world. With events in the Middle East distracting the
US, China has moved aggressively to consolidate its
influence in the region and work toward the goal of eventually kicking the US out of Asia.
With the US focused
elsewhere, China
has been able to achieve its goals in the region virtually unopposed. The
US needs to regain the
initiative in Asia and bog China
down in its own region in order to inhibit Beijing's ability to derail EU-US
convergence. Outside of Japan
and India this region may
seem unimportant and therefore not merit much attention from the US.
However, this is a western view that fails to recognize Beijing's strategy.?China's
history in this region and foreign policy priorities make the countries in this
region more important to China
than the West realizes.?Therefore, the
goal is not to bring Southeast or Central Asia into the Grand Alliance, but
rather to take advantage of the greater importance that China attaches to them
by making it appear that they are leaning towards the Grand Alliance-- or at
least staking out an independent stance not aligned with the Grand Alliance,
but also not aligned with China.?The US does not have to successfully turn these
countries into allies, but simply needs to make China feel that its influence in these
countries is threatened. However, if the US
does succeed in prying some of these countries away from China's grip,
then that is an added bonus.
US
Penetration of ASEAN
The first
specific set of China's
neighbors that deserves attention is the ASEAN countries.?To the West they are small, insignificant
countries that have no geopolitical value to the larger strategy of the Grand
Alliance.?But to China they are
countries that have historically been under Beijing's influence and therefore
have symbolic power in that the reclamation of their "Tributary"
status is important for the re-emergence of China as a great power.?This historic relationship between Southeast
Asia and China also presents
an opportunity for the US
because it is the source of many grievances against China that can be exploited to diminish
Chinese influence in the region.
Many of these
countries have a strong sense of nationalism that stems from centuries of
fighting for independence from their larger neighbor to the North.?The US
should try to use its soft power to foment this nationalism and shape it into
an anti-Sino form of sentiment that would pressure their government to be less
acquiescent with Beijing.?Accomplishing this would be very
difficult.?Covert US cooperation
with parts of these countries?art and media communities could be useful.?Monetary encouragement for the creation of
books and movies that highlight the historical atrocities committed by China against
these countries could rekindle past grievances.?
Even the soft power of Hollywood
could be useful given its global popularity.?
So, while the US
government would not be able to make the Vietnamese resent the Chinese, a
Hollywood blockbuster about the celebrated Trung sisters who repelled the Han
dynasty or a native Vietnamese author’s historic account of past Chinese
aggression might stoke Vietnamese nationalism by reminding the Vietnamese how
troubled their history with China
has been.?
Also, some of
these countries, like the Philippines,
Thailand, and Indonesia
have domestic problems with ethnic-Chinese minorities controlling a
disproportionate amount of economic power relative to their size.?Again, the US
should quietly try to highlight these problems in order to make these
countries' populations more hostile to China. Working with local
journalists to describe and expose the large wealth disparity between the
Chinese and the locals could do a lot to incite anti-Chinese sentiment.?These feelings are already there, as can be
seen by anti-Chinese rampages in Indonesia in 1998.?These tactics are unlikely to make the
governments of those countries ignore their interests and directly oppose
China, but anti-Chinese sentiments of their populations could be enough to make
Beijing's dealings with them that much more difficult. Also, any severe
anti-Chinese incidents could force Beijing to
abandon its non-interference policy and act to protect the overseas Chinese
community, which it still sees as part of China.?Any Chinese intrusion into another sovereign
state’s territory would hurt Beijing’s
image in the region.
Other tactics
that would focus more on the interests of these states would be the settlement
of the territorial disputes of many islands in the South
China Sea.?China currently claims the Paracel and Spratly Islands
while many other ASEAN countries like Vietnam,
Malaysia and the Philippines
also have claims on them.?China has in the past addressed these disputes
very aggressively and has even resorted to force with Vietnam. The US should work with ASEAN to try to settle these
disputes, but in a way so as to isolate China and put it into direct
confrontation with these countries.?It
should also make sure that the format of any negotiations includes all ASEAN
members as one bloc and not just be a series of bilateral agreements.?Otherwise, China would use its strength to
bully the other countries in a one-on-one format.?If the US
were successful in having a united ASEAN confront China
on these issues, China
would then be forced to do one of two things. It could use carrots to try
to entice all of the concerned parties or use the stick to coerce them.?Economic and political coercion could act to
drive ASEAN away from China
and to the US
while military action would do the same but also damage their international
reputation. Economic and political incentives, on the other hand, run the
risk of doing the opposite and helping cement Chinese dominance in the region,
but it would also force Beijing
to expend more resources there and increase its cost of empire in the region.
These outcomes aside, the time consumption of the process is almost as
important. If Beijing
were involved in serious dialogue about the demarcation of its maritime
boundaries, something that is very important considering the vital sea lanes
this area contains, it would be less focused on US-EU convergence.
The
Special Case of Burma
Events currently
unfolding during the writing of this paper warrant that the country of Myanmar (Burma) should receive special
attention.?The military junta that
controls Myanmar, the SLORC,
has been a client regime of China
for a long time. While many western nations have limited their trade with the
country due to its human rights record, China has continued to do business
with the regime and has firmly brought it into its sphere of influence. China has done this because controlling Burma has many benefits for China's future
goals. The first benefit is the natural resources vital to China's growth, most notably timber and natural gas,
which the Chinese are extracting from Burma.?The second and third reasons are both related
to Burma's
location. Burma sits
on the Indian Ocean and China
has used this location to build many ports. China
currently has plans to build a pipeline from one of these ports to its Yunnan province, thus
giving the Chinese the advantage of bypassing the Straits of Malacca, a
possible choke point. Also, these ports give a supply and fuel depot for
China's future blue water
navy, which will allow the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to operate in
the Indian Ocean and be closer to their potential rival, India.?That last goal of China
has been noticed by India
and has forced them to pay close attention to Myanmar.
Currently, large
masses of civilians being led by Buddhist monks are protesting the regime and
presenting it with its strongest challenge in seventeen years. Whether or
not this particular development will evolve into a larger rebellion and the
destruction of the military junta remains to be seen.?But if this incident does not end up bringing
down the junta, it is clear that there are strong internal forces that want to
see the end of the current regime. The US
should work with India
and do all it can to help those forces in deposing the SLORC and installing a
new democratically-elected regime. It is no guarantee that any new
regime will be enthusiastically pro-West or pro-India, but it is almost assured
that it will be less pro-China.
The Battle for Central Asia
The next region
to examine is Central Asia. This
region's location and energy resources make it very appealing to China.?However, since the US
invasion of Afghanistan the
region has had a large US
presence.?The US's
involvement in the region has spurred the creation of the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization which is a vehicle for Russia
and China to work together
for the purpose of expelling the US from the region. This
cooperation between Russia
and China, though, is only
existent because they both happen to share an interest in getting the US out
of the region. Beyond that there is not much trust in the relationship
and actually is a latent competition for influence in the region.?For this reason, it might be beneficial for
the US
to withdraw from the region. This seems counterintuitive for the US to battle Chinese influence by withdrawing
from a region and possibly leaving it open for China,
but the vacuum created could be better for the US. The first reason it may
be beneficial is because Russia
is included in designs for the Grand Alliance and the US's presence in the region has angered and
insulted Moscow because it appears to be a US
invasion of its traditional sphere of influence. Secondly, it eliminates
a source of convergence of Chinese and Russian interests.?Finally, a US
withdrawal from the region could create a vacuum in which Moscow
and Beijing come to compete against each other,
in which case Russia
could be driven further into the camp of the Grand Alliance. By doing
this the US is risking
losing Central Asia to Chinese influence, but it stands to gain a bigger prize
in Russia.
However, if US withdrawal is unpalatable either because of
the risk of handing that resource-rich region over to China is too
high or because it is too vital a strategic asset for US counterterrorism
efforts, then other options need to be explored.?A more palatable policy might be staying
involved in Central Asia while bolstering the region so that it can
independently stand up against China.
To do this the US needs to
focus on the key country of Kazakhstan.
This country, which is the largest and wealthiest of the region, has a leader
who already has ambitions of becoming the leader of Central
Asia. The US
should work with Russia in
courting Kazakhstan and
bringing it closer to Europe and Russia
than it is to China.
China will fight vigorously
to prevent this because Kazakhstan
is a large country bordering China,
it has strong ethnic ties to China's
Xinjiang province, and because it controls many pipelines that carry energy
resources into China.?So far China has taken advantage of the
tiny countries by using its size to put pressure on them in a one-on-one basis.
To change this, the US
should encourage more regional cooperation so that there could be a unified
voice when dealing with China.?A more unified Central Asia would still be
tiny compared to China,
but at least it would be a little better positioned to negotiate with the
Chinese. President Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan has expressed his desire
for more cooperation in the region and has even proposed a Central Asian market.
Any level of unity in Central Asia would naturally be led by Kazakhstan.
Therefore, if the Western democracies and Russia
can first win over Kazakhstan
and then help it to form a unified Central Asian bloc, the rest of the region
will follow. To persuade Kazakhstan
to look West, the interests of Kazakhstan
must be considered.?Given the nature of Kazakhstan's
government, its interests are decided by the individual ambitions of its
president. He is an autocrat who has already secured president-for-life
status and destroyed most of his internal opposition. What he needs now
is international legitimacy and recognition.?
Therefore, the members of the Grand Alliance should mute their
criticisms of his government and help him attain the international publicity
that he desires.?One encouragement they
could give is to abandon their opposition to his desire to chair the OSCE in
2009.
Phase Three: ?/span>Going Global
Africa: No Longer the
White Man's Burden
So far the
recommendations given have focused on China and the surrounding region.
However, in the past decade China
has emerged on the world stage as it looks to secure vital natural resources
and gain international recognition.?One
of its grandest feats yet has been to conquer Africa.
China has very quickly and
cleverly consolidated its presence in Africa
by offering illegitimate and unsavory regimes UN protection in exchange for
lucrative business dealings.?This
development is a fait accompli and should not try to be reversed by the western
democracies.?Trying to do so would be too
costly and unlikely to succeed in the near future.?The resentment of colonization still lingers
in many nations and China's own history of being colonized and abused by the
same powers gives it credibility that the US and Europe do not have when it assures
them that it does not want to interfere with their domestic affairs.?However, if China
aspires to have an honorable reputation amongst the nations of the world, then
the West should do everything to hold China accountable for its closeness
to cruel and oppressive regimes.?Therefore,
the US and Europe should turn the tables and make China's new found pro-status
quo position a liability by making its costs of empire in the continent as high
as possible.?The US should analyze
China's presence in every country individually and then choose one of two
options: 1) When possible, it should draw attention to egregious human
rights abuses performed by regimes friendly with Beijing and use the
international outcry against its support of these regimes to blackmail China
or, 2) support anti-regime forces to destabilize those resource-rich nations that
are friendly with China in order to hinder Chinese business dealings.
The first tactic
can be used in cases like Sudan.
In those cases human rights organizations and activists should be aided in
attacking China's
public image and force its PR machine to work even harder at preserving its desired
image.?These campaigns against China's image should be directed towards the
Olympics whenever possible as this is a unique event in which China is especially sensitive about
its public image in the world. This attack on China's
image should be pushed to the point where China has to either back out of its
commitments of non-interference to certain regimes, and thus lose credibility
with others, or risk being vilified on the world stage, thus making it easier
for democracies to see the merits of the Grand Alliance.
If
the second tactic is employed the aim is to make China sink more and more resources
into protecting its business interests. Every time China reaches a deal with a
regime, that regime should be attacked by internal anti-regime forces so as to
make China spend more time and resources to protect the regime, or if that
regime is overthrown, then sink more resources into trying to buy the new
regime. This tactic plays on the fact that it takes more resources to maintain
stability in a country than it does to destabilize a country.?The abundance of rebel militias and
separatist groups in Africa makes it so that nearly every African regime has a
ready enemy that the US
could call on to attack Chinese interests in the region.
Caveats
?It
should be noted that the policies discussed here are just proposals; they need
to be more closely examined for their feasibility and whether or not any
negative side effects would potentially offset their benefits or interfere with
broader foreign policy goals.?Many of
these proposals depend on covert operations abilities that the intelligence
agencies may not have or are not willing to use.?Also, all of these proposed policies have
foreseeable possible consequences that do not pertain to the desired effect on
Chinese policy but could make them unattractive.?Therefore, before implementation they should
be more closely analyzed to first list all possible outcomes and then create
plans to address these outcomes.?
Conclusion
It needs to be
stressed that the intent of these proposals is to merely require the Chinese to
take their attention off of the core Grand Alliance countries and instead focus
on and expend vast resources in the peripheral countries.?China is in many aspects a
first-rate power that is capable and willing to use its weight to get what it
wants in the world. These proposals are not intended to be prohibitive
forces to China’s emerging
power status; all of these challenges to Beijing’s
goals could be easily overcome and defeated by a determined China.?The key to this plan is to try to concert all
of these efforts so that China
is confronted with a multitude of dispersed threats to its interests at the
same time.?This strategy will not allow Beijing to focus and
concentrate its might on any one problem and will force it to give up on some
foreign policy goals as it prioritizes its interests. If Beijing is
forced to choose between its various foreign policy goals, thwarting EU-US
convergence will likely be one of the first goals to be abandoned as the
formation of the Grand Alliance is only a possible future threat where as firm
control over China and the Asia-Pacific region are considered more vital and
urgent to Chinese interests.?That
prioritization of goals is what allows this plan shield the formation of the
Grand Alliance.